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Forests across the world stand at a crossroads where climate and land-use changes are shaping their future.
Despite demonstrations of political will and global efforts, forest loss, fragmentation, and degradation
continue unabated. No clear evidence exists to suggest that these initiatives are working. A key reason for
this apparent ineffectiveness could lie in the failure to recognize the agency of all stakeholders involved.
Landscapes do not happen. We shape them. Forest transitions are social and behavioral before they are
ecological. Decision makers need to integrate better representations of people’s agency in their mental
models. A possible pathway to overcome this barrier involves elicitingmental models behind policy decisions
to allow better representation of human agency, changing perspectives to better understand divergent points
of view, and refining strategies through explicit theories of change. Games can help decision makers in all of
these tasks.Introduction
Forests across the world stand at a crossroads. Climate change1
and land-use change,2,3 both end points of larger and complex
chains of cause and effect, will shape their future. Although
changes in climate and land use are not independent from
each other,4 the underlying processes work at different time-scales: decades to centuries for changes in temperature and
rainfall patterns against years and sometimesmonths for agricul-
ture conversion, infrastructure development, logging operations,
and political regime shifts.5 Agriculture is the main driver of
deforestation.6,7 Net deforestation in the tropics dominates8
with various regional drivers:9 ranching and soybean expansionOne Earth 2, May 22, 2020 ª 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. 417
Figure 1. Detected Tree-Cover Loss and
Institutional Timelines
Despite demonstrations of political will and global
efforts, tree-cover loss continues unabated. No
clear evidence exists to suggest that these initia-
tives are working (data by Global Forest Watch;
tree-canopy density > 30%).
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Perspectivein Latin America,10–12 subsistence agriculture in Africa,13,14 and
small-holder farming linked to industrial plantations in Asia.10,15
According to Global Forest Watch, annual tree-cover loss
reached 29.7 million hectares globally in 2016, a 51% increase
since 2015. In the tropics, 12 million hectares—an area the
size of Belgium—were lost in 2018 alone.16
Multiple initiatives worldwide—including the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), Aichi Target 15,17 the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD+),18 the Bonn Challenge, the Rio+20 land-degradation
neutrality goal,19 and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)
1520—all had stated ambitions to reverse these trends. Sixty
percent of the 500 most influential companies in forest-risk sup-
ply chains have made deforestation commitments in one form or
another.21 The New York Declaration on Forests, Initiative
20320, the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative
(AFR100), and similar initiatives seek to restore deforested and
degraded land. The Bonn Challenge Barometer of Progress re-
ports that 47 countries are pledging more than 160 million hect-
ares for Forest Landscape Restoration through voluntary, non-
binding initiatives, and 43.7 Mha were reported as being
restored.22 More recently, the World Economic Forum launched
in February 2020 the 1t.org project, a global initiative to grow,
restore, and conserve one trillion trees around the world. They
join other similarly named initiatives (Plant for the Planet, the Tril-
lion Tree Campaign, and Trillion Trees) aiming to unite govern-
ments, civil society, companies, and private individuals in a
global-scale nature-restoration movement. Despite repeated
failures to meet many earlier targets and leaving aside the possi-
bility of ulterior motives held by leaders and representatives,
these efforts show that the stated collective ambition to preserve
forests remains strong (Figure 1).
Despite the demonstration of political will and global efforts,
forest loss, fragmentation, and land degradation continue un-418 One Earth 2, May 22, 2020abated and are reaching a critical point.23
No clear evidence exists to suggest that
the current restoration initiatives are work-
ing (Figure 1). Despite corporate commit-
ments, commodity-driven deforestation
persists,9 and new evidence suggests
that targets, e.g., 10% of the government
pledges to the Bonn Challenge, were set
without consideration of the biophysical
capacities of the system.24 Successes
here and there do not register at the global
scale, and at best they tell the story of bat-
tles won but of a losing war.
Why are policies designed to halt defor-
estation and increase restoration of forestlandscapes apparently missing their target?We hypothesize that
a key reason for ineffectiveness lies in a failure to recognize the
agency of the many stakeholders involved—their capacity to
act independently and to make their own free choices—and
the adaptive capacities of the systems we seek to steer. Land-
scapes do not happen; we shape them. They are the result of
the sum of individual actions and decisions made by all stake-
holders and the interactions between these and the biophysical
processes.25 Forest transitions in the Anthropocene are primarily
driven not by ecological processes but by social processes,
including policy and economy, and social behaviors. When for-
est transitions happen, they are the result of a change in the
way humans govern and manage ecosystems. From the smaller
community of hunter-gatherers to the largest corporations, it is
only and always humans who make decisions.
Agency is a blind spot in our decision-making processes and
a possible reason why global policies and initiatives to halt for-
est degradation and foster restoration fail. In this Perspective,
we suggest a possible pathway to overcome this weakness.
We first introduce two widely applied theories (forest transition
and sustainability transition and transformation) and then elab-
orate on the reasons for policy failures. We then propose a radi-
cally new approach, where we discard the assumption that it is
feasible or necessary to work toward achieving a common
vision for transformation. We propose a method that allows de-
cision makers to align forces despite different and sometimes
opposing values and worldviews without the necessity to find
beforehand a ‘‘common vision.’’ The core of our approach rests
in the elicitation of the mental models used by decision makers,
a necessary step that allows for a better representation of hu-
man agency in them. Games can represent these models and
be designed to portray the needs, constraints, and aspirations
of the stakeholders they refer to. Such games, when played,
allow the self-actualization of the decision makers who
play them.
A B
Figure 2. The Forest Transition Theory,
Deforestation, and Forest Landscape
Restoration
Forest transition theory is a description of the
changes that a landscape—initially a country—un-
dergoes when its forest cover stops shrinking and
starts expanding amid growing human population,
2013Forest transition theory is a description of the
changes that a landscape—initially a country—un-
dergoes when its forest cover stops shrinking and
starts expanding amid growing human population,
increased technical capacities, and changing cul-
tural values. With agricultural expansion as the
major driver of forest loss, the curves of forest area
and agricultural area complement each other. The
expansion of remaining forests, forest landscape
restoration, and active plantation programs explain
the recovery of forest area. The forests at the end of
the process are different from those at the begin-
ning. Policy interventions can speed up or slow
down the transition. A policy to reduce and stop
deforestation can at best flatten the curve (A). Forest
landscape restoration can potentially redress it up
to the maximum ecological potentialities of the
locality (B). Halting deforestation and restoring
landscapes are equally needed for operating the
transition. Modified from Rudel et al.,27 Lambin and
Meyfroidt,28 and Mather.29
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Forest Transition Theory
Forest transitions—defined as regional-scale shifts from a
shrinking to an expanding forest area—serve as a heuristic
framework for conceptualizing forest landscape change
(Figure 2). This framework distinguishes three distinct phases
where (1) fragmentation, (2) deforestation and degradation, or
(3) restoration and reforestation are the main processes shaping
the landscape (but see Bogaert et al.,26 who classify fragmenta-
tion as a case of deforestation and note that fragmentation and
deforestation can continue even as restoration occurs). This
trend is represented with the forest transition curve,27,28 a theo-
retical construct that maps changes in forest cover area for a
given region or nation over time.29 The theory has shortcomings.
Forest quality is not well represented, and degradation, if it is
higher in the second phase of the transition, can happen all along
the forest transition curve. The forests that return are not neces-
sarily the same as those that disappeared in structure, composi-
tion, and function.30 Other limitations of the theory include how it
defines forests, the explanations it offers to the transition, and its
generality.31 Despite these, the forest transition theory remains
one of the foundations of current thinking on forest landscape
change.32–34
Sustainability Transition Theory
A multi-level perspective (MLP) of nested scales is commonly
used for modeling socio-technical transitions35–38 and has
been used in forest-governance contexts for analyzing condi-
tions across policy levels.39–41 It identifies three analytical levels
(Figure 3). The macro level (1) includes the broader political and
socio-economic trends, values, and normative landscape. The
meso level (2) consists of the current socio-technical regimes,
rules, and routines that define the ‘‘way of doing things at themoment,’’ e.g., the production system including rules and actors
from industry, policy, science, and users. Themicro level (3) con-
sists of niches where experimentation with novel technologies,
practices, and policies, collectively referred to as innovations,
takes place. In niches, innovations are shielded from regime in-
fluences,42,43 but over time experimentation can be expanded
to ‘‘spaceswhere networks of actors experiment with, andmutu-
ally adapt, greener organizational forms and eco-friendly tech-
nologies.’’44 The MLP does not correspond to specific scales.
Rather, it can be applied to different scales ranging from regional
to national and local depending on the analytical context. The
MLP also describes under which conditions a stable regime
could radically change through a ‘‘regime shift.’’45 A shift is
possible when novel practices mature, gain traction through
economies of scale, for example, and replace dominant prac-
tices in the regime.46,47 Examples of successful transitions
come foremost from sectors with a strong technological char-
acter, such as electricity systems,48–50 ‘‘green’’ cars,51,52
biogas,53 and sustainable housing.44
Because of economies of scale, the costs of innovations can
be considerably reduced over time, making them much more
competitive against conventional practices. However, in sustain-
able agriculture, e.g., in coffee agroforestry systems,55 econo-
mies of scale are not easily created. In the case of sustainability,
transitions happen only when sufficient pressure is put on the
normative landscape to create opportunities to adopt innova-
tions. Therefore, the transitions are unlikely. The example of cof-
fee is telling. Despite policies and agendas, agroforestry coffee is
in decline globally.56 Should the transition happen, in coffee or in
other sectors, it would still have the potential to create inequality
if the interests, needs, and constraints of small-scale producers
were left aside, pushing them out of the system.54,57–59One Earth 2, May 22, 2020 419
Figure 3. The Multi-level Perspective Theory
Framework
The landscape represents the norms and values
that shape our collective enterprise. The regimes
capture current rules and processes that define ‘‘the
way of doing things.’’ Innovation happens at local
scales in niches protected from competition. Ac-
cording to this theory, the upscaling of innovation by
change agents can create regime shifts, redefining
how we do things, but this requires pressure from
the landscape level. This figure depicts a point in
time where a novel practice has gained traction and
regime shift is just starting. Note that ‘‘landscape’’
here does not refer to the physical landscape.
Adapted from Geels.54
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System Lock-In
Systems have memory60 that conditions what possible future
states the system can take. Path dependency describes the
notion that the pathways the system can take are bounded by
a ‘‘corridor of the possible’’ beyond which certain states are
impossible and certain decisions appear unthinkable.61 Once a
system is engaged in a certain pathway, continuation in the
same direction becomes more probable—a lock-in is in place.62
Existing market and land-policy distortions underprice the use
of natural resources, making business-as-usual production sys-
tems more competitive in the short term.63 Innovations to tackle
forest loss and degradation are generally based on policy instru-
ments (e.g., certification, payment for ecosystem service
schemes, and offset requirements64–66) that are designed to
internalize environmental costs and are, hence, more expensive
to implement than the alternatives. For example, forest-manage-
ment certification was promoted as a market-based solution to
the failure of public policies to protect forest resources.64,67
However, its adoption has been limited, especially by forest
communities, by the costs involved. Where adopted, it has pro-
moted and shaped sustainability transition processes by intro-
ducing new concepts in national policy arenas.40,68 Simply
scaling up the current forest-certification models, however, will
not lead to a regime shift. A focus on macro-level processes is
required.69 The challenges facing forests, particularly tropical
forests, usually originate from outside of forests and the forestry
sector.9
People and Their Values and Beliefs
Ultimately, human actions and behaviors—migrating in or out, in-
vesting in tree planting, and allowing land to lie fallow—deter-420 One Earth 2, May 22, 2020mine whether a transition will occur.70
These choices and actions are driven by
economic factors and markets; policies;
social norms, rules, and beliefs around
land use and management; the assets
accessible to the agents making the deci-
sions; and ultimately, their free will and
agency (Box 1). In the end, we all make
choices and decisions with different levels
of power and effectiveness, and these de-
cisions shape either the landscapes or the
decisions of those who shape them.71Social groups actively fabricate their knowledge and versions
of reality through everyday interactions. Actors work within bio-
physical constraints, regulatory structures, complex social net-
works, and power imbalances that invite, discourage, or forbid
certain actions. Individuals are not passive rule followers but
actively create, use, and reproduce social norms—the unwritten
rules to which people adhere.73 The individual’s understanding
of the norm might be accurate or not. Further, different individ-
uals might share the same understanding or not. Theymake their
decision on the basis of the information available to them, their
capabilities, and their compliance to the norms, laws, and pol-
icies or their capacity to evade enforcement and tolerate risk.
Thus, before forest changes are observed on satellite imagery,
the trends are first socially constructed by actors holding expec-
tations that might or might not be based on correct perceptions
of physical realities or laws, norms, and individual capabilities.
Understanding social perceptions, rules, and norms is therefore
essential to driving social, and ultimately ecological,
change.74–76
The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiver-
sity and Ecosystem Services has stressed the importance of in-
clusive valuation.77 Its regional assessments highlight how
diverse values and value systems shape interactions between
people and nature, including the use, management, and conser-
vation of nature’s contributions to people.78,79 They describe
how incorporating a diversity of social values into decision-mak-
ing processes can contribute to successfully designing and im-
plementing effective conservation and sustainable use plans,
as well as to achieving the SDGs.79,80 Values—aswell as the cur-
rent emotions, preferences, and personalities of decisionmakers
or the characteristics of options81—drive decisions.82 Therefore
recognizing the role and personal contexts of local decision
Box 1. Case Study: Mount Elgon, Uganda
Geography.Mt. Elgon is a solitary extinct volcano straddling the Uganda-Kenya border (4,321m) and is located at 010700600N and
343103000E. Below the Afroalpine and ericaceous zone (from about 3,200 m), there is an Afromontane zone and an Afromontane
rainforest zone. The forests and higher-elevation areas are protected by a national park, and nearly all land within 20 km is under
small-scale cultivation or grazing. Population densities, ranging between 300 and 1,000 p/km2, are high.
History.Mt. Elgonwas first established as a forest reserve (1929) for timber andwater-catchment values. Pine plantations replaced
some forest in the north (1955), and neighboring people settled inside the reserve. In 1968, forest management in Uganda was
centralized, and reserve boundaries were officially demarcated. Under President Idi Amin (1971) and Milton Obote (1978), most
forests were encroached by (small-scale) farmers. Starting in 1987, efforts to restore forest on Mt. Elgon were implemented, first
through a forest-restoration program and then through increasing the level of protection of the forest to that of a national park
(1993), evicting and/or resettling forest residents, and cracking down on illegal forest uses. In the 1990s, collaborative approaches
to forest management were introduced in an effort to reduce conflicts between park management and local residents and improve
conservation outcomes. Overall, these interventions have halted forest-cover loss and even led to some restoration (see figure
below). However, forest restoration was successful in only a few places; renewed clearing sometimes reversed initial success,
and restored cover is often highly degraded. Overall recovery is limited, and conflicts are still very common. Forest conservation
on Mt. Elgon in Uganda is a classic illustration of a wicked problem.
Forest Transitions onMt. Elgon. The figure below shows nested forest-transition curves for Mt. Elgon in Uganda between 1960 and
2009 for the whole forest zone (magenta line) and split among sub-areas. These show the balance of factors supporting forest con-
servation and forest loss. The study found that single drivers of forest change failed to explain the historical changes on Mt. Elgon,
especially for forest recovery. Instead, it found that local forest-cover trajectories on Mt. Elgon were determined by actions driven
by local historical cultural preferences around land and forest use; over time, these interact with changing contexts of markets and
market access, conservation policies and their expression in terms of access to resources, and external political interference (see
figure below). For example, in the first phase, population pressure and wealth drive forest clearing, but later there is recovery in
wealthy densely populated areas but forest loss in poor, relatively low population areas.
Attempts to drive forest recovery on Mt. Elgon have not sufficiently recognized the social norms and beliefs that govern people’s
actions. For example, in one area, strong traditional forest-use rules broke down after the area was declared a national park, and
forest that had resisted previous drivers of deforestation started to be degraded. Efforts to reduce conflict and forest loss through
forest-resource use agreements havemixed results. They generally do not sufficiently meet people’s needs or give them adequate
ownership and are therefore often used as opportunities to access the forest for more destructive activities, as illustrated by field
assessments in this study. The relationships among stakeholders on Mt. Elgon are characterized by distrust.
Mt. Elgon illustrates how forest transitions are embedded in social transformations and the importance of understanding these in
order to drive social and therefore ecological change. For example, onMt. Elgon, with its enormous population pressure and strong
claims on forest resources, conservation managers might have to radically change their perceptions on forest conservation and
accept lower levels of forest intactness that balance longer-term minimum conservation needs with meeting local needs for
ecosystem services.
(Continued on next page)
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Perspectivemakers and decision influencers in fostering (or preventing)
forest transitions is key to understanding how to support and
promote forest recovery. However, there is more at stake than
values.
The systemic shifts required for the forest transition to happen
are unlikely to follow from a gradual change in values held by de-
cision makers. They demand rapid large-scale behavioral transi-
tion that will occur only if social norms change.83 We resist
changing our values because these define our identity.84 Aware-
ness-creating activities aimed at changing values will meet with
limited success unless they are targeted at young people whose
identities and values are not yet crystallized.85
Actions are driven by values as well as by beliefs.86 We make
decisions on the basis of what we want (our desires) filtered by
what we think will happen (our beliefs).73 Whether these beliefs
are justified is not of primary importance. The ‘‘illusion of un-
derstanding,’’ a set of overly simplistic, unjustified assump-
tions about complex and uncertain topics, proves to be a
powerful driver of action.87 However, the closer our mentalmodels are to the actual network of causal links that shape
the landscape, the smaller the gap between the intended con-
sequences of our actions and their effective impact will be.73 In
addition, whether correct or incorrect, our expectations of
others’ behaviors and attitudes influence our behavior. When
people prefer to act like most others, beliefs can be self-fulfill-
ing.88 Changing the expectations of what others will do can
then create abrupt shifts in behavior and trigger a chain
reaction.83 The pathways connecting actions and beliefs are
two-way avenues.
Bringing about Radical Transformations
We propose that it will be very expensive, perhaps even futile, to
invest in trying to change the values of decision makers in order
to bring about forest transitions or any other systemic environ-
mental transformations. Developing a common vision of what
the world should be will be difficult, exhausting, and possibly
impossible if the values held are at loggerheads. More impor-
tantly, it is not required.One Earth 2, May 22, 2020 421
Box 1. Continued
This figure shows forest-cover change for the entire forest zone of Mt. Elgon, Uganda (magenta line), and within 2 km of villages
adjacent to the park (blue and purple lines). The split among different groups of villages reflects a broad focus on either coffee or
maize for income and, together with other contextual factors, aids our understanding of local variation in forest-transition trajec-
tories and their contribution to the overall forest-zone curve. Southern villages are presented separately to illustrate the reversal of
a forest-regeneration trend among traditionally coffee-focused villages in the south. Underlying drivers considered include, among
others, prices and markets for major crops, national-level politics, population, and changing conservation policies. Modified from
Sassen et al.72
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PerspectiveFor collaboration between agents to emerge, they do not need
to agree on a common objective or shared vision. It is sufficient
that they agree on how the world works and how it could change.
Agreeing on How Things Are
We propose that a path less trodden for policies and interven-
tions is to provide reasons for people shaping the landscape or
shaping the decisions of others in the landscape to change the
expectations they hold about what others will do or how the
ecosystem will respond.83 It means working on creating agree-422 One Earth 2, May 22, 2020ment around a common understanding of how things are
(descriptive approaches) instead of focusing on how things
should be (normative ones). It means asking how the system
works so people provide mechanistic explanations rather than
asking them the reasons of the positions they defend.87 Asking
how instead of why allows three things happen:
First, people can relate to their empirical knowledge of the sys-
tem and feel secure if their own perception of reality is repre-
sented adequately in the discussion.
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will lead to surprises, given that one’s point of view is suddenly
shifted. In so doing, we create the conditions for epiphany
learning (EL) to happen. EL occurs when agents suddenly and
dramatically alter their behavior.89 EL is different from reinforce-
ment learning, prevalent in the decision-making literature. In
cases such as the ones we outline here, learning happens all at
once. The neurological pathways leading to such epiphanies
have yet to be understood.89
Third, when no trust exists between parties, a common
description of how things are (independently of the values we
attach to them) serves as common entry point for building agree-
ment. Trust is critical in collective action,90 but it is not given and
is possibly overrated.91 The processes we advocate do not
require altruism or trust between parties. Nor do they void the ne-
cessity of strategic foresight by all parties: intelligent, organized,
and often powerful resistance to environmentally motivated
change is an important feature of most environmental issues.92
They do require pragmatism and sound methods such as the
ones we expose below to be successful.
What role can science play?One of the classic roles assigned
to scientific research is ontological. Society expects science to
generate new knowledge that will change our understanding of
what the system actually is, establish trends, ascertain new or-
ders of magnitude. This is akin to exploring the ‘‘what’’ of forest
landscape change. The map of intact forest landscapes93
played such a role. By giving a precise definition to an until
then fuzzy concept and proposing a first map outlining their
extension and location, the authors created a new viewpoint
on forests and a new layer of information. In doing so, they initi-
ated a policy transformation that led to the integration of new
forest-management requirements by the Forest Stewardship
Council and their adoption by certified operations 6 years
later.94 The estimation of the number of trees on Earth95 had
a similar impact by transforming the Billion Trees campaign
into the Trillion Trees campaign, when decision makers
involved in that initiative realized the magnitude of the pro-
cesses they wanted to influence. More recently, the estimation
of Earth’s tree-restoration potential played a similar role by
changing the public perception of the value of forest as a natu-
ral climate solution.24
Understanding the changes in forest cover, as well as
measuring whether and to what extent forests are degraded or
expanded, is therefore crucially important for putting topics on
the agenda. A descriptive framework that quantifies and moni-
tors the status of forests should in principle be able to contribute
to modifying individuals’ perceptions and evolving social norms
toward a more unified vision and thus reduce false understand-
ing of individuals in a group. However, given that definitions of
forests are political statements, simply agreeing on what to
monitor already proves a challenge.96 Ontological research
and quantitative monitoring frameworks are needed but are not
sufficient for creating the transformations we call upon.
Becoming Self-Aware
A theory of change (ToC) and other similar approaches make it
possible to document and examine assumptions, causality,
and the steps along a project-development pathway.97 They
do so by articulating the hypotheses that underlie potential path-
ways to change and making anticipated cause-effect relation-ships explicit. A ToC focuses attention appropriately on how
the system works as opposed to why it should work in a certain
way. Such a reflexive process improves the chance of designing
and implementing successful projects.98–100 The participatory
nature of a ToC development and refinement is key to
success.98,101
The widespread use of a ToC both as a process and as a prod-
uct in the development of policies and projects tackling defores-
tation, forest degradation, and reforestation would contribute to
more realistic long-term goal setting and allow for learning and
adaptive management. It facilitates transparency on collective
beliefs and reveals differences in the assumptions among stake-
holders.102 If framed not as a normative issue but as a descrip-
tion of the status quo, the use of a ToC helps stakeholders
who might not all agree on an overarching objective to smooth
the way for reflection and shared negotiation of common or
compatible goals and solutions.103 As a dynamic process, the
ToC can support the collective testing of assumptions within
the intervention.98 As outcomes begin to be realized, the ToC re-
visits both the logic and the assumptions of the policies and pro-
jects to ensure that change is taking place as intended. A key
aspect of the process is to strengthen stakeholder ownership
and continuously revisit pathways of change while ensuring
that the scenarios produced are relevant to policymakers and
practitioners.
Understood as such, a ToC thus outlines a strategy for
achieving a stated objective.99 It is first developed on the basis
of the mental model of the decision makers.104 It necessarily in-
cludes statements on the expectations of how stakeholders will
respond to initiatives. Through the process of revisiting it, the
mental model can be refined. With a ToC thus come two keys
for success: the elicitation of mental models that allow self-
awareness of those undergoing the process and the design of
a learning process that allows the models to be refined.99
Flaws and inaccuracies in the mental models, however, will be
costly, create delays, or even foster opposition. This process is
often referred to as ‘‘muddling through,’’ an expression used in
policy development, administration, and landscape manage-
ment.25,105 There are ways to fast track the process of testing
and validating one’s mental models. They involve engaging
actively in scenario construction. The essence of such prospec-
tive analysis is to explore possible futures106 rather than to pre-
dict what will happen. The aim is to highlight the forces that drive
the system to make better decisions today about the future.107
However, the complexity of the landscapes we address defies
the cognitive capacities of most of us. As with a game of chess,
with its 10120 estimated variations,108 it is easier to explore the
behavior of a system by using a board and pieces than to play
with a blindfold. We suggest that games, as models of strategic
situations, can help here too if only we can convince decision
makers to play them.109,110
Learning by Playing
In a game, the outcomes of an action depend on the interactions
between one’s decision, the decisions of the other players, and
the rules of the game. A game is therefore a model of a strategic
situation.111 Games are adaptable to different viewpoints and
can represent different roles, information, and power asymme-
tries. Their development and manipulation help people cope
with complexity.109 Games can be developed to help usOne Earth 2, May 22, 2020 423
Figure 4. Agent-Based Model Framework
The games we develop use the basic architecture
common to most multi-agent systems but are
applied to landscape and natural-resource man-
agement. A first layer details the physical landscape
and its heterogeneity (1). Resources, including
ecosystem goods, are present in this landscape,
and each resource has its own sub-model to
describe its dynamics (2). Stakeholders are repre-
sented as agents and have different qualities of life,
access to capitals, knowledge, and skills (3).
Stakeholders manage the land and the resources
according to their needs, capacities, and aspira-
tions. In addition, stakeholders are embedded in a
policy, social, and institutional environment made of
other agents (4) with whom they interact and that
contributes to shaping their strategies. The crucial
element is the mental model of the agent (5) and her
perceived environment, which will condition the
choices she makes. Adapted from Ferber and
Weiss.114
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Perspectiveunderstand landscape changes and map environmental con-
flicts.112 Based on the companion-modeling approach,113 their
design involves the collective elicitation of the mental models
that underlie decisions and the transformation of these mental
models into a game that will serve as a tangible and adaptable
boundary object (Figure 4).
Developed through participatory processes, a game can repre-
sent all the crucial actors, resources, processes, and interac-
tions—ecological, social, economic, and political—relevant to
the discussion.114,115 Such a game is then understood as the
combination of tokens (what the system is), a set of commonly
agreed-upon rules (how the system works), and players.116 Play-
ing the game lets stakeholders confront their understanding of the
system with the narrative presented by the game. The game
poses challenges to the players, responds to their decisions,
and invites them to think strategically. They can then pitch their
strategies against those of the other players and against the en-
gine of the game—the core rules that define what is possible
and what happens. This process acts as a reality check of the as-
sumptions that participants have.116 It allows creating consensus
on how the system works; when participants agree, the rules
represent the system that they are familiar with. Games enable
stakeholders to share and confront their perceptions to better
grasp the complexities of the system, to explore alternative fu-
tures in a low-risk environment, and to negotiate new forms of col-
lective action.117 The insights gained can then be translated into
real life first as a refined ToC and then as actual policy proposi-
tions. This is the process that negotiators of the Forest Steward-
shipCouncil RegionalWorkingGroup for HighConservation Value
Areas experimented in August 2017 in Brazzaville. They used
MineSet, a game developed to explore the links between mining
and logging activities, to agree on the definition of regional indica-
tors for intact forest landscapes.118 The game allowed all partici-
pants to create a common understanding of a system they
thought they knew. Going back and forth between reality and424 One Earth 2, May 22, 2020the game enabled discussions that were
more constructive. Using the board, rules,
and tokens as a tangiblemodel to represent
situations, counterfactuals, scenarios, andtheir consequences brought clarity to their narratives. Preceding
the negotiations with a game session allows the game to become
a tool for establishing an inclusive, engaging, and constructive
dialog and facilitate the negotiation process, leading to an agree-
ment when none was previously in sight.119
Any method that confronts mental models through the con-
struction of boundary objects would contribute to the same
objective. Why should we focus on games particularly? Because
to overcome the cognitive biases that prevent changes to our
mental models, there are few better ways than to force people
to take a new vantage point and to look carefully at what can
be seen from that point.112,117 When faced with a situation that
is beyond their control yet in a safe environment, participants
become alert, a state that makes it easier for them to reflect
and learn.120 Games thus play the role of the third key to success
by providing tools and methods to improve the participants’ ca-
pacity to learn and placing their own agency center stage.
Outlining the land-use futures and pathways of change re-
quires the identification, definition, and testing of policy innova-
tions and new business models through scenario development.
These must then be transposed to the system to help foster the
transition. Decisionmakers engaged in this process need tomap
policy innovations and business models that suggest alternative
pathways away from business as usual by challenging the exist-
ing regimes of forest governance. They can look for innovations
that aim to challenge the incumbent regime, introduce change to
existing practices, and provide alternative pathways. Given that
forest governance is fragmented across jurisdictions and in-
cludes multiple actors, the identification can span from local
levels to international politics. This can require national arrange-
ments121–123—including governance instruments by state, mar-
kets, and civil society—as well as hybrid modes of governance
and public-private partnerships, such as logging concessions
and co-management of resources.124 It can also influence so-
cial-private partnerships, such as community ‘‘conservancies’’
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Perspectiveand payments for ecosystem services.125,126 Identifying syn-
ergies between various policy innovations and business models
can strengthen policy environments that foster transitions.127
Besides identifying policy innovations and business models,
decisionmakers need to identify the individuals, groups, or orga-
nizations that can be influenced to achieve the transition.128 The
selection of boundary partners will most likely target a wide
range of actors involved in land-use sectors, including firms, in-
vestors, users, non-governmental organizations, and various
government agencies. Although we advocate change through
collaboration and co-creation through exploration of common
futures and changed expectations, changing the status quo
and the existence of intelligent opposition could also require ac-
torswho employ destructive change strategies, such as confron-
tational campaigns and demonstrations.129 All of these pro-
cesses enter in the revision of the ToC. By then, the journey to
transformation will already be well underway.
Conclusions
Landscapes are shaped by a multitude of interacting factors
acting on different spatial and temporal scales. Climate and
land use are two end points in long and complex causal chains
that influence forests globally. Forest-cover loss and forest
degradation have negative impacts on biodiversity and the pro-
vision of ecosystem services originating from forest systems.
They are essential for millions of forest-dependent communities.
They contribute to the likelihood of emerging infectious disease.
They reduce the capacity of forests to contribute to climate miti-
gation through carbon sequestration. To counteract deforesta-
tion, global initiatives and policy instruments have been created.
Yet forest loss continues. Deforestation happens because
locally, and in the short run, it is the most logical and rewarding
course of action. Doing what is rational depends upon the
context one is in, and land-use change is no exception. These
negative impacts are balanced by the extraction of timber and
other goods originating from the forests, the allocation of more
space to agricultural production and infrastructure, and the
ensuing economic and social benefits. The gains to be made
from deforestation outweigh the negative impacts—at least in
the short term and for the subset of stakeholders who actively
engage in clearing and degrading forests. Unless the context
changes, decisions are unlikely to change. Yet, the context itself
is shaped by the biophysical processes and by the decisions of
others. More specifically, this is a function of what we under-
stand of the biophysical processes and of the expectations we
have on the decisions of others.
This self-referencing process leads to a self-reinforcing
pattern of landscape change that can be broken by an abrupt
change in perceptions about how the world works. Fostering for-
est transitions thus requires decisionmakers at all levels to better
understand their own perceptions and values, as well as those of
the other stakeholders involved. This is first a call to introspec-
tion, and it is true for all decision makers be they working fields,
sitting in a minister’s office, or sitting on a board. The higher the
power of the decision maker, the more pressing the need. Until
this happens, policies risk continuing to target the wrong stake-
holders for the wrong reasons.
We have highlighted the three keys that can unlock this radical
change: (1) gaining self-awareness of the mental models of howthe system works and including better representations of human
agency in them, (2) adopting a process to revise and improve
these mental models through a participatory process such as
the ToC, and (3) using games and other boundary objects that
decrease cognitive obstacles to learning and prevent self-actu-
alization. In adopting this approach, decision makers will directly
address human agency, the Gordian knot at the root of defores-
tation and forest degradation. We need that to design more
meaningful and effective strategies and policies.
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